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Background: Egalitarianism and altruism are two ways in which people may have attitudes that go beyond the
narrowly defined selfish preferences. The theoretical constructs of egalitarianism and altruism are different from
each other, yet there may be connections between the two. This paper explores the empirical relationship between
egalitarianism and altruism, in the context of health.
Methods: We define altruism as individual behaviour that aims to benefit another individual in need; and
egalitarianism as a characteristic of a social welfare function, or a meta-level preference. Furthermore, we specify a
model that explains the propensity of an individual to be egalitarian in terms of altruism and other background
characteristics. Individuals who prefer a hypothetical policy that reduces socioeconomic inequalities in health
outcomes over another that does not are regarded ‘egalitarian’ in the health domain. On the other hand, ‘altruism’
in the health context is captured by whether or not the same respondents are (or have been) regular blood donors,
provided they are medically able to donate. Probit models are specified to estimate the relationship between
egalitarianism and altruism, thus defined. A representative sample of the Spanish population was interviewed for
the purpose (n = 417 valid cases).
Results: Overall, 75% of respondents are found to be egalitarians, whilst 35% are found to be altruists. We find that,
once controlled for background characteristics, there is a statistically significant empirical relationship between
egalitarianism and altruism in the health context. On average, the probability of an altruist individual supporting
egalitarianism is 10% higher than for a non-altruist person. Regarding the other control variables, those living in
high per capita income regions have a lower propensity and those who are politically left wing have a higher
propensity to be an egalitarian. We do not find evidence of a relationship between egalitarianism and age,
socioeconomic status or religious practices.
Conclusion: Altruist individuals have a higher probability to be egalitarians than would be expected from their
observed background characteristics.
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Egalitarianism and altruism are both attitudes that go
beyond immediate selfish concerns. Yet, as we describe
below, altruism is about the nature of one’s own utility
function, while egalitarianism is about the kind of Social
Welfare Function (SWF) one has a meta-level preference
for. Thus, at a theoretical level, there is no reason to as-
sume that the two are associated with each other. How-
ever, the two concepts may be supported by the same* Correspondence: a.tsuchiya@sheffield.ac.uk
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article, unless otherwise stated.people in the real world. One reason why this may hap-
pen is because both concepts are associated with social
norms and practices. There are established social norms
that prescribe individuals should be helpful to others
and that equality should be promoted: indifference is
regarded as disgraceful and inequality as reprehensible.
Furthermore, it might be expected that altruistic people,
who are willing to sacrifice own resources (money, time,
blood) to benefit others in need, are also more likely to
believe in egalitarian redistribution from those who have
more to those who have less. But if so, are altruists actu-
ally more likely to be egalitarian, beyond what would bed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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is what we want to test empirically. There are a number
of studies that looked at the presence of these in ex-
perimental settings [1,2]. The objective of this paper is
to examine empirically how these two are related in the
health context and using survey data.
Health is a context where egalitarianism and altruism
may play an important role in individuals’ preferences.
For example, the supply of blood in many places is based
on voluntary donations with no financial reward, and
thus on altruism. On the other hand, publicly funded
health systems in many places hold as an important pol-
icy goal the reduction of socioeconomic health inequal-
ities, and thus are egalitarian. At the same time, it has
been shown that for example, in Spain, while the major-
ity of the general public support egalitarianism [3], only
a much lower proportion of the population donate blood
regularly [4].
What has not been analysed so far is the potential
connection between egalitarianism and altruism in the
health context which will contribute towards understan-
ding the true motivations of individuals’ preferences. In
particular, to the best of our knowledge, studies have not
explicitly considered and measured the effect of altruism
on the preference for egalitarian policies in the health
domain.
In terms of determinants of egalitarian preferences in
health other than altruism, sex and political affiliation
have been explored by [5], finding that amongst Swedish
politicians, women and, as expected, those left wing have
relatively more sympathies towards equity. In addition,
[6] find that age, per capita income of region of resi-
dence and the way the question is administered to re-
spondents have an effect on the propensity to choose an
egalitarian policy; while sex and socioeconomic status
(proxied by education level and household income) have
no significant effect.
This paper explores empirically the relationship between
egalitarianism and altruism, in the context of health. The
second section presents the concepts of altruism and
egalitarianism. The third section then presents the me-
thods of the empirical study. The fourth section reports
the results and the final section concludes.
Concepts of altruism and egalitarianism
Altruism
Let us begin first with altruism, because this concerns
the nature of individual preferences, and thus relates to
a more fundamental level for economic theory than
egalitarianism, which relates to an interpersonal and less
fundamental level. Standard microeconomic theory be-
gins by assuming that homo economicus is ‘selfish’ and
‘rational’. This does not carry any judgmental implica-
tions (i.e. it does not imply that the economic agent ismorally suspect), but simply means that economics aims
to model individual choice by assuming that individuals
will make decisions aiming to maximise their own individ-
ual utility subject to their personal budget constraints.
However, real humans are capable of unselfish behav-
iour. To accommodate this, economists can take a closer
look at the individual utility function, and introduce the
concept of ‘caring externalities’ [7,8]. This is when the
utility of an individual (i) is a function of (amongst other
things such as i’s own consumption) the welfare of an-
other individual (j) where j is likely to be somebody
regarded by i to be ‘in need’. There is a related literature
on ‘interdependent utilities’, which is where the external-
ities are reciprocal [9,10]; but this also includes the case
of envy (negative externality) and not just altruism (posi-
tive externality). Once a utility function with caring ex-
ternalities is built, economists can model and predict the
decisions of an individual with such a utility function
(for instance, see Jones-Lee [11]). In a way, the individ-
ual with caring externalities remains selfish and rational
in the sense that they maximise their own utility. We
may call this instrumental altruism: behaviour that bene-
fits others, but is fundamentally motivated by selfishness
(see for example McGuire et al. [12] or Mooney [13]).
If society is made up of just two individuals i and j,
then this framework works well to explain altruistic be-
haviour. However, when society is made up of three or
more individuals, the concept of public goods becomes
relevant, and alongside this, the possibility of free-riding
[7,14,15]. If i’s utility is affected by j’s welfare, then i’s
utility can be improved if some third party (say, k), also
with caring externalities, took action to improve j’s wel-
fare (unless the only way i’s utility improved from j’s
welfare was when the improvement was due to i’s own
action; see next paragraph). This means that, because k
cannot stop i benefiting from j’s welfare improved by k,
and vice versa, j’s welfare is now a public good. If this
became common knowledge, then both i and k may not
act to improve j’s welfare. Each may count on the other
to act and try to free-ride, thus leading to an under-
supply of the public good. The implication of this is
that if individuals are fully rational and information is
complete, then altruistic behaviour in a world with more
than three individuals becomes increasingly difficult to ex-
plain, even with caring externalities.
There are other approaches that aspire to go beyond
instrumental altruism, and assume that human beings
are capable of going above oneself and of behaving in
line with another’s welfare completely disregarding self-
ish interests because it is intrinsically ‘the right thing to
do’. The debate at this point becomes somewhat se-
mantic. If the individual gains any satisfaction, or ‘warm
glow’ [16], from feeling one is doing the right thing (or,
if the individual is to suffer regret for not doing the right
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instrumental altruism. However, it may be noted that
unlike its instrumental version, the altruism here is not
affected by the public good scenario above, because for
the positive externality to arise for i, it is not enough to
simply know j’s welfare has been improved; the improve-
ment has to be attributed to i. Then, improving j’s wel-
fare becomes a means to a more fundamental end, to do
good, and in this respect, again, altruism can be regarded
as being something instrumental rather than intrinsic
(but at a different level).
For practical purposes, it makes sense to define altru-
ism as behaviour that aims to benefit another individual
in need. It seems unnecessary to require altruism to be
incompatible with self-interest or to demand that altru-
ism involves bringing net loss to oneself. Just like the
technical term ‘selfish’ does not carry any moral conno-
tation, the technical term ‘instrumental altruism’ need
not carry any implication that it is morally less worthy
than an act of intrinsic value. Thus, we regard altruism
as something that goes beyond immediate selfish con-
cerns, but not necessarily something that goes against
immediate selfish concerns, or something that is incom-
patible with wider selfish concerns.
In this paper we will consider blood donation as a
proxy for altruism in the health context. Donating blood
for transfusion to total strangers has featured in the
literature as a classic example of altruistic behaviour
[17-21]. However, blood donation is a peculiar case be-
cause of its own nature. There is limited supply of blood,
and since every unit of blood transfused to a particular
patient is a unit of blood that cannot be used for another
patient, there is opportunity cost associated with its use.
It is a highly perishable good with a strict ‘use by’ date
beyond which it should not be put to therapeutic use, so
effective management of its stocks is important. In
addition, it is a resource that can only be procured by
drawing it from another human being; modern biotech-
nology has not yet achieved the synthesis of artificial
blood. While blood donation entails some time costs,
very mild pain, no health benefits, and possibly some
self-satisfaction to the donor, it can have substantial
health benefits to the recipient. One complication associ-
ated with analysing blood donation is that not everybody
is medically eligible to donate. However, accounting for
this is arguably less problematic than devising an appro-
priate way to adjust for variation in budget constraints
when analysing monetary donations.
Egalitarianism
Egalitarianism implies equality of something (i.e. the
‘equalisand’), and thus involves comparing across at least
two parties. The key issue in any debate of egalitarianism
concerns the question, equality of what [22], and mayconcern capabilities, income, utility, achieved health, and
so on. The objective of this paper is not to argue for a
specific equalisand: we will start by simply taking ‘equal-
ity of outcomes’ as the equalisand for now, and focus on
health later.
Even then, this may lead to some confusion, if egalitar-
ianism is defined with respect to resulting distributions
of outcomes alone, independently of the mechanism be-
hind it. For instance, a distribution-neutral social welfare
function (SWF) can lead to egalitarian outcomes if indi-
viduals share the same risk averse utility function. This
is because such a utility function has diminishing mar-
ginal utility, and social welfare will be maximised if the
marginal good is distributed to the person with the lar-
gest marginal utility, which is the least well off person.
Over time, this set up will result in everybody achieving
an equal distribution of the equalisand, and thus an un-
intended egalitarian outcome.
A somewhat less powerful but similar example is a
distribution-neutral SWF combined with individuals with
caring externalities towards those with low welfare. Then
again, under certain conditions, social welfare maximisa-
tion and inequality reduction will coincide, and over time
an egalitarian distribution will be achieved, without any-
body being egalitarian. However, trying to base egalitarian-
ism on individual-level preferences such as caring-based
positive externalities seems contrived, because it is not
clear why the type of externality should be restricted to
those that are caring. A group of individuals with envy-
based negative externalities could also achieve an egalitar-
ian distribution in the long run without intending to.
Such an apparent paradox where a distribution-neutral
social welfare function leads to egalitarian distributions
can be avoided if the concept of egalitarianism is re-
served for the aggregate level. Then, egalitarianism will
be about the functional form of the SWF, and not about
the functional form of individual utility functions (e.g.
diminishing marginal utility) or what is included in these
(e.g. caring externalities). Then, there are two paths to
take. One is to say because the above distribution-neutral
SWF gives equal weight to everybody’s welfare, it is itself
egalitarian, and thus there is no paradox in the first place.
However, taking this route is not compatible with egalita-
rianism defined as equality of outcomes. The other is to
define egalitarianism as explicit efficiency-equality trade-
offs, and to require preferences with diminishing marginal
rate of social substitution (MRSS), which is in effect the
approach used in conventional welfare economics [9,23].
This is the definition used in this paper.
The next issue then is the mechanism for determi-
ning the MRSS. One approach would be to base it on re-
vealed (collective) preference. If data are available where
analysts can compare numerous actual policy decisions
made in the real world, then a SWF may be fitted to the
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this would allow the identification of the SWF in the de-
scriptive sense. Another approach is to base it on stated
or expressed preferences of individuals using hypothet-
ical states of the world, involving different distributions
of outcomes, and asking the individuals to indicate their
choices. Individuals faced with such an exercise may ap-
proach it in two ways.
One would be to form a view regarding which position
one may find oneself in, and to choose from this ‘private
or personal perspective’ in line with what would be to
one’s own benefit (with or without caring externalities
as may be the case). This is what happens under the
Rawlsian setup of the veil of ignorance with extreme risk
aversion [24]. However, this does not involve any refer-
ence to a SWF. In other words, the maximin rule is not
derived from the so-called Rawlsian SWF. It is the other
way round, and it is the Rawlsian SWF that is a product
of maximin, which in turn is the rational choice of ex-
tremely risk averse individuals behind the veil of ignor-
ance. Thus in our terminology, the egalitarianism of the
maximin rule is unintended. If individuals are completely
risk neutral, then the veil of ignorance will lead to a
distribution-neutral (and therefore non-egalitarian) SWF.
If we require egalitarianism to be defined by a SWF
with diminishing MRSS and we wish to elicit this through
stated preference, then we need respondents to engage in
the exercise with reference to the ‘societal or citizens
perspective’, in line with how, in their judgment, society
should allocate resources. In other words, the parameters
of an egalitarian SWF cannot be derived by looking at the
individual’s own utility function, but can only be captured
by some meta-level preference along the lines of Sen’s
‘meta-ranking’ [25], Hare’s ‘critical thinking’ [26], or the
‘social perspective’ [27].
In the context of health, defining egalitarianism in
terms of equal outcomes means equalising health out-
comes. There can be further variations to this: equalising
health across individuals, or across population groups?
And if across population groups, which groups? Or, what
is the measure of health used? Is it inequality in health
at any point in time, or in lifetime health? For the pur-
pose of this paper, we will use reducing inequality in life
expectancy at birth across socio-economic groups as the
working example of egalitarianism in health.
Methods and data
Methods
We specify a model that explains the propensity for an
individual to be egalitarian in the above sense. An un-
derlying (or latent) variable (E*) represents an individ-
ual’s propensity to choose, or not choose, an egalitarian
health policy that reduces inequality in outcomes as
opposed to a policy that does not. We examine theassociation between this propensity for egalitarianism
and altruism (A), controlling for a series of observable
background characteristics. As a proxy for altruism, we
consider whether the individual is or has ever been a regu-
lar blood donor (provided they are/were medically capable
of doing so). This is not the only way in which altruism
could be captured but we believe that this should be a rea-
sonable proxy, particularly in the health context.
In line with previous evidence outlined above, we hy-
pothesise that people’s attitudes towards egalitarianism
will be explained by their demographic, socioeconomic,
ideological, together with religious characteristics. Par-
ticularly, starting with demographic factors, sex (Sex)
and age (Age) are considered. Secondly, since we are
dealing with attitudes regarding socio-economic health
inequalities, we may expect there to be some pattern by
the respondent’s socio-economic status: proxies useda to
explore this possibility are education (Edu), whether the
individual is unemployed (Unempl). Thirdly, the per ca-
pita income of the region of residence (Reginc) is used to
control for regional variation by grouping the region by
mean income. Fourthly, we consider that people’s at-
titude towards egalitarianism can be affected by both
political affiliation or ideology (Ideol) and religious prac-
tice (Relig).
Thus, the model can be written as:
Ei ¼ E Ai; Sexi;Agei;Edui;Unempli;Reginci; Ideoli;Religi
 þ εi
ð1Þ
In model [Eq. 1], the i subscripts represent individual
respondents, and εi captures unobserved influences, which
are assumed to have a standard normal distribution with
zero mean and constant variance.
In practice, E*is unobserved. Instead, we observe Ei,
which is a dummy variable representing whether or not
the individual actually chooses the egalitarian policy.
Therefore, it is the realization of a binomial process
defined by:
Ei ¼ 1 if E > 0½ 
So, if the individual’s propensity to be egalitarian is
positive (E*> 0) s/he will choose the egalitarian policy
(Ei = 1), and if otherwise (E
*≤ 0) s/he will not (Ei = 0).
The estimation process will be undertaken through
probit regressions. Likelihood ratio (LR) tests and Reset
specification tests will be carried out to appraise the ap-
propriateness of the different functional forms.
We have information to distinguish individuals who
are (or have been) regular blood donors from those who
are not (or have not been). Furthermore, we can identify
those individuals who are not blood donors due to me-
dical or health reasons. It would be inappropriate to
classify this latter group as non-altruists, since we have
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have been blood donors if their medical/health restric-
tion did not exist. Therefore we treat them as missing
and exclude them from the analysis. If such medical re-
strictions on blood donation applied at random, then
amongst this sub-population the proportion of those
who would otherwise have donated blood would be the
same as the proportion of those who donate blood
amongst the rest of the population; and the effect of al-
truism and the rest of covariates on egalitarianism
would not be significantly different. Therefore, exclud-
ing them from the analysis would not introduce a bias.
However, if this is not at random, then regression ana-
lyses that exclude these respondents will be biased (i.e.
selection bias would occur). Tests for selection bias and
correction, if necessary, are undertaken estimating a
probit with sample selection [28]. The probit with sample
selection works in a manner very similar to the Heckman
model [29] except that the response variable is binary. For
this selection model, let us assume an underlying (unob-
served) variable that determines the selection of individ-
uals into groups, i.e. Pi = 1 when > threshold, and Pi = 0
when ≤ threshold, represents the probability of the indi-
vidual to be able to donate blood. It is assumed that is a
linear function of some of the exogenous variables in
model [Eq. 1], in addition to some identifying variables:
Di ¼ D Sexi;Agei;Edui;Religi;Healthi;Rurali;Prinsi
 þ ui
ð2Þ
The identifying variables include the health state of
the individual (Healthi), whether the individual is resi-
dent in a rural area (Rurali), and whether the individual
has private insurance (in addition to public health insur-
ance) (Prinsi). The main criteria used here for proposing
this set of identifying variables is that the variables have
an impact on the probability to be able to donate blood
but are unrelated to the individual’s preference for ega-
litarian policies. ui is a random error term normally
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Selec-
tion bias occurs when there is correlation between D
and ε (and therefore between ε and u); in other words,
when unobservable factors that influence the eligibility
to be a blood donor are also influencing the probability
to choose the egalitarian option. If so, selection bias will
be corrected. To check whether selection bias is absent
we will test, firstly, whether ρ (the correlation of resid-
uals) is significantly different from zero: if the covariance
between ε and u is significantly different from zero, then
we cannot reject that there is no selection bias. In ad-
dition, a comparison of the estimates of the main egali-
tarian model with and without the blood donor selection
model is undertaken: a large change in the coefficients, a
change of the sign of the coefficients, or a change in thestatistical significance of the coefficients between the
models with and without selection will indicate the ex-
istence of selection bias.
Finally, our model [Eq. 1] is built to analyse the effect
of altruism on egalitarian attitudes of individuals, and
relies on the assumption of exogeneity of the right-
hand-side variables (such as political affiliation, religious
practice and others, in addition to being altruist). Given
that altruism is the main focus of this paper, we will con-
sider the potential endogeneity of this covariate only. in
particular, although it is assumed that altruism may
affect egalitarianism, it could be the case that egalitarian
attitudes also have an effect on altruism. If this is the
case, we would have an endogeneity problem caused
by simultaneity, where conventional estimators will be
biased and inconsistent. Exogeneity of the covariate al-
truist is tested through the Smith and Blundell test [30].
This involves a two-stage procedure where altruist is
first modelled using instruments and the residuals from
this regression are entered in the second regression
modelling egalitarian. The test examines whether these
residuals are significant in the second regression. If not,
then the null hypothesis that altruist is exogenous can-
not be rejected, and the model specified as [Eq. 1] is ac-
cepted. However, if the test result is significant, this means
the null is rejected so that there is an endogeneity prob-
lem. As identifying binary variables we consider whether
the individual is an organ donor (Organi) and whether the
individual abstained in the previous general elections
(Abstenci). To be valid, firstly, the instruments should be
correlated with altruism (individually and jointly signifi-
cance tests are undertaken): we anticipate that those who
are organ donors are more likely to donate blood as well;
and regarding abstention in the previous elections, we ex-
pect those individuals who did not vote are less concerned
about collective actions and therefore are less likely to do-
nate blood. And secondly, the instruments should be un-
correlated with the error term of the egalitarian equation:
this is tested with the Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of ove-
ridentifying restrictions. Once the validity of the ins-
truments is established, if the Smith and Blundell test
statistic is not significant then it would suggest that
the estimations are consistent and unbiased. Otherwise,
simultaneity should be addressed by constructing instru-
mental variables for this endogenous regressor.
Data and variables definition
The questions were designed by the authors and the data
were collected during 2004 by ASEP/JDS (a commercial
survey company) in Spain, a country with a National
Health Care System characterised by universal cover-
age and tax funding. A survey of 801 individuals over
18 years of age was undertaken. Face to face interviews
were assigned across the 17 “Comunidades Autónomas”
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lation proportionally. Within each of the Regions, in-
terviews were randomly allocated so that the achieved
sample will be representative of the general Spanish popu-
lation in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. In
general, 49% of the individuals were male, with average
age of 45 (SD 17.9); and 51% female, with average age of
48 (SD 18.6).
Regarding egalitarianism, the interview questionnaire
included one question in which the respondent is asked
to think as if s/he was a decision maker who has to choose
between two alternative health programmes. Figure 1 re-
produces the visual aid used in the interviews. Initially, the
respondent is presented with a 5-year difference in life ex-
pectancy at birth between higher and lower socioeco-
nomic classes (78 and 73 years respectively). Social class is
defined on the basis of occupation: high social class is rep-
resented by professions like doctors or lawyers, whilst low
social class is represented by road sweepers or cleaners.
Programme A would increase the life expectancy of both
classes by 2 years each (and therefore maintain the current
5-year gap in life expectancy); whereas programme B
would increase the life expectancy of the worse-off
class by 4 years (and reduce the current inequality).
The respondents are informed that both programmes
have exactly the same cost. Then the respondent is
asked as follows: As you can see, programme A targets
both social classes equally and programme B targets
the lower social class. Please, tick the corresponding
box indicating whether you would choose programme
A, programme B, or if you consider that both programmes
are equally good. The dependent variable egalitarian
takes the value 1 if the individual prefers the prog-
ramme that reduces health inequality, and 0 if the in-
dividual does not.
With respect to the approach to altruism, the respond-
ent is asked whether s/he is, or has been, a regular blood
donor. Those who reply “no” are asked for the main rea-
son from a short list. Those who select “because of med-
ical reasons” at this stage are excluded from the analysisProgramme A
73
78
+2
+2
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
Class 1 Class 5
 for A
Figure 1 The visual aid given to respondents.as explained above. The binary independent variable al-
truist takes the value 1 if individual i is or has been a
regular blood donor, 0 if otherwise. Note that in Spain,
blood donations have always been voluntary with no
monetary (or in-kind) remunerations. Regarding the rest
of factors that we have controlled for, age has been cate-
gorised in four dummy variables: age (18–35) (baseline
category), age (36–45), age (46–55), age (56–65), and age
(66+). The binary variable female indicates whether the
individual is female or not. Regarding the socioeconomic
variables, education is recorded by level of schooling and
has been categorised in three dummy variables primary
education those with primary school education or less
(baseline category), secondary education, and university
education; and the dummy variable unemployment indi-
cates whether the individual is currently working. Per
capita income in the region of residence is captured by
three dummies: high income region (Madrid, Navarra or
País Vasco), low income region (Andalucía or Extre-
madura) and middle income region (the rest of Spain,
the omitted category). Political affiliation is recorded
by the binary variable left wing (those who report them-
selves being centre-left, left or extreme left wing). Finally,
the binary variable no religion indicates that the respond-
ent does not practice a religion.
Regarding the identifying variables for the probit with
sample selection, the self-reported measures of health
include a categorical indicator that records whether indi-
vidual considered their general health during the twelve
months prior to the survey to be very poor, poor, fair,
good and very good. So we have three dummies fair
health (for those with very poor, poor or fair health, used
as the baseline), good health and very good health. Popu-
lation size of the area of residence is proxied by small
area indicating whether the individual lives in an area of
10,000 or less inhabitants. Last, private health insurance
records whether the survey respondent has private
health insurance (in addition to the public health insur-
ance). Finally, regarding the instruments to test for exo-
geneity of the covariate altruist, we have considered theProgramme B
73
78
+4
+0
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
Class 1 Class 5
 for B
Table 1 Summary statistics
Whole sample Valid cases Sample used
in the probit
N = 566 N = 417
Variable N Mean Mean Mean
Egalitarian 770 .735 .751 .751
Altruist 800 .244 .258 .350
Female 801 .506 .510 .470
Age (18–35)* 801 .327 .327 .381
Age (36–45) 801 .195 .207 .225
Age (46–55) 801 .132 .133 .120
Age (56–65) 801 .149 .150 .132
Age (66+) 801 .197 .184 .141
Primary education* 799 .343 .304 .259
Secondary education 799 .538 .565 .604
University education 799 .119 .131 .137
Unemployed 799 .064 .067 .065
Middle income region* 801 .605 .643 .643
High income region 801 .192 .170 .175
Low income region 801 .202 .187 .182
Left wing 654 .564 .564 .580
No religión 764 .450 .472 .513
Fair health* 801 .262 .223 .161
Good health 801 .634 .668 .722
Very good health 801 .102 .109 .118
Small area 801 .242 .219 .230
Private health insurance 796 .139 .164 .149
Organ donor 791 .096 .101 .101
Abstention 717 .162 .085 .089
*Denotes baseline category.
Table 2 Cross frequencies egalitarians/altruists (n = 417)
Altruist Non-altruist
Egalitarian 118 (28.3%) 195 (46.8%)
Non-egalitarian 28 (6.7%) 76 (18.2%)
The four cells add up to 100%.
Pearson chi2 (1) = 3.984; p = 0.046.
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http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/13binary variable organ donor indicating whether the res-
pondent reports being registered as an organ donor; and
the binary variable abstained indicating whether the re-
spondent abstained in the 2004 general elections.
Research ethics clearance
Research ethics clearance was given by Research Ethics
and Animal Welfare Committee at the University of La
Laguna, March 2013 (ref. CEIBA2013-0060).
Results
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Out of the
801 respondents involved in the relevant questions, item
non-response leads to 235 missing cases, which corre-
sponds to 29% of the entire data, leaving 566 valid obser-
vations. As can be seen, the distribution of background
characteristics across the whole sample and the sample
used in the analysis are very similar Of these, 149 in-
dividuals report that they cannot donate blood because
of medical reasons, and are excluded from the analysis.
Regarding the remaining 417 individuals, 75% are egali-
tarians (i.e. prefer the egalitarian policy) and 35% are
altruists (i.e. report to be or have been regular blood do-
nors). If we categorise the individuals in the sample ac-
cording to these two variables of interest (see Table 2),
most of the respondents are egalitarian and non-altruists
(47%), followed by those who are egalitarian and altruists
(28%), those who are neither egalitarian, nor altruists
(18%) and finally those who are non-egalitarians but al-
truists (7%). The corresponding chi-squared test shows
that the egalitarian and altruist characteristics are not in-
dependent, and there is a statistically significant relation-
ship between both categorical variables (p < 0.05).
Now, the question is whether this empirical relation-
ship holds when we model egalitarianism as a function
of altruism and other background characteristics. Probit
estimations for the egalitarian model [Eq. 1] are shown
in the first column of Table 3. The reset test shows that
there is no evidence of mis-specification: the chi-squared
test statistic is 0.180 with a p-value above conventional
levels (p = 0.672). Overall, the model is statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.05) but the McFadden R-squared statistic
is just 0.075; however, as is often the case when the pro-
bit is applied to cross-sectional data (with modest sam-
ple size) the goodness of fit is low. Estimates indicate
that altruism has a significant and positive effect on the
propensity to support egalitarianism (p < 0.05), once con-
trolling for other factors.
The third column of Table 3 shows the probit mar-
ginal effects. Given that all of the covariates are binary
variables, the marginal effects are interpreted as the per-
centage point change in the probability of being an egali-
tarian resulting from a discrete change in the explanatory
variable. Particularly, other things equal, the marginaleffect of altruism on egalitarianism is 0.097 indicating
that on average, the probability of an altruist individual
supporting egalitarianism is 10% higher than for a non-
altruist person. Regarding the other control variables,
those living in high per capita income regions have a lower
propensity to be egalitarian by about 17% compared to
those living in middle income regions (p < 0.05). On the
other hand, as expected, those who are politically left wing
have a significantly higher probability to be an egalitarian
compared to those who are centre-right. In particular, the
probability of a left wing individual being egalitarian is on
average 15% higher than the reference individual, other
Table 3 Probit results for egalitarian
Coeff. Rob.std.Err. Mg.effect
Altruist .331 (**) .152 .097
Female −.038 .139 −.011
Age (36–45) .161 .185 .047
Age (46–55) −.076 .231 −.024
Age (56–65) .251 .240 .071
Age (66+) .395 .262 .108
Secondary education −.066 .192 −.020
University education −.380 .248 −.127
Unemployed −.268 .284 −.088
High income region −.518 (**) .184 −.175
Low income region −.261 .188 −.084
Left wing .485 (**) .147 .151
No religion .212 .147 .065
Constant .375 .257
N = 417.
Wald chi2(13) = 33.84; Prob > chi2 = 0.001; McFadden’s R2 = 0.075.
Reset test:chi2(1) = 0.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.672.
**p-value < 0.05; *p-value < 0.1.
Dependent variable: egalitarian.
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economic status and religious practices do not have a sig-
nificant association with the probability to be egalitarian.
Estimates for the egalitarian model with sample se-
lection [Eq. 2] to accommodate medical restrictions on
blood donation can be seen in Table 4. The correlationTable 4 Results on probit with sample selection
Egalitarian (E)
Coeff. R.std.Err
Altruist .328 (**) .147
Female .031 .145
Age (36–45) .194 .186
Age (46–55) −.061 .251
Age (56–65) .356 .239
Age (66+) .564 (**) .280
Secondary education −.061 .192
University education −.363 .247
Unemployed −.267 .267
High income region −.497 (**) .175
Low income region −.238 .185
Left wing .455 (**) .151
No religion .191 .156
Constant .456 (*) .266
N = 566; censored = 149.
Wald chi2(13) = 34.10; Prob > chi2 = 0.001.
LR-test indep. eqns: rho = 0; chi2(1) = 1.14; Prob > chi2 = 0.2853.
**p-value < 0.05; *p-value < 0.1.coefficient (ρ) is not statistically different from zero (p =
0.285), suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that there is no selection bias. In addition, the sign,
the magnitude and the t-ratios of coefficients of this
egalitarian model with selection are quite close to those
of the initial egalitarian model without selection [Eq. 1],
with the only exception of the t-ratio of the binary vari-
able aged 66 or more. Regarding the potential endoge-
neity of altruism, the Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity
indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
altruist is exogenous: the test statistic is 0.00548 and the
p-value is 0.941. The instruments organ_don and abstenc
appear to be valid: F-test show that the instruments are
jointly significant (chi2 (2) = 19.11 (p < 0.05) and t-tests
also indicate that they are individually significant in the
altruist equation (p < 0.05); in addition, the Amemiya-
Lee-Newey chi-squared test is 2.070 with a p-value of
0.1503, showing that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term of the egalitarian model (i.e. there-
fore, providing further support for instrument validity).
Discussion
Egalitarianism and altruism are both attitudes that go
beyond immediate selfish concerns. However, the two
theoretical constructs are different from each other, and
yet, there may be connections between the two at the
empirical level.
Would we expect that those who are altruist to be
also egalitarian? In this study we have found that inBeing able to donate blood (D)
Coeff. R.std.Err.
Female −.346 (**) .124
Age (36–45) −.232 .186
Age (46–55) −.654 (**) .207
Age (56–65) −.576 (**) .209
Age (66+) −.663 (**) .217
Secondary education .097 .156
University education .081 .225
No religion .113 .130
Good health .646 (**) .145
Very good health .412 (*) .236
Small area .244 .157
Private health insurance −.374 (**) .163
Constant .648 (**) .259
/Athrho −.563 .552
Rho −.510 .408
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are egalitarian (i.e. have a preference for an egalitarian
policy) but not altruist (i.e. report not to be or have been a
regular blood donor); over a quarter are both egalitarian
and altruists; and a fifth are neither egalitarian nor altruist.
This relationship is confirmed through a model of ega-
litarianism: the probability of an altruist individual being
an egalitarian as well is significantly higher than for a
non-altruist person, controlling for other background
characteristics.
Regarding the other covariates, gender was found to
have no significant impact on the propensity to be egali-
tarian, in line with the results of [6] but unlike [5] which
found that women are relatively more sympathic to-
wards equity. In line with the findings of [6], the so-
cioeconomic status was also found to have no effect on
attitudes towards socioeconomic inequalities in health,
which might be indicating a non-selfish response behav-
iour, so the questionnaire might be picking up correctly
the societal preferences, as aimed. Different conclusions
are reached by Hudson and Jones [31] who showed that
those more educated are less averse to higher taxes for
health policy issues. Also in line with [6], living in a high
per capita region is negatively associated with a prefer-
ence for egalitarian policies. However, unlike it, neither
age nor religious practice had any significant effect. Fi-
nally, as expected, those politically left wing are more
likely to prefer egalitarian policies, evidence that was
also found previously by [5] and [6].
We acknowledge that blood donation is only one of
several possible altruistic behaviours, and is not a perfect
measure. However, it is a behaviour that has been used
in the literature as an example of anonymous altruistic
giving in the context of health, [20,21,32,33]. There may
be individuals who are altruists but do not donate blood
because of medical reasons; we have excluded these ca-
ses from the analysis and undertaken analysis to check
for potential sample selection. The analysis did not dis-
tinguish between the remaining reasons for not dona-
ting, which included: aversion to needles; not having
thought about it; because others already do it; and any
other reason. We decided simply to consider whether or
not the individual is or has been a regular blood donor
as a proxy for altruism, taken at face value. The implica-
tion is that those who are willing to donate but for
whom it is highly inconvenient to do so (e.g. because
there are no facilities nearby) are treated as not altruis-
tic, which may be problematic. However, the proportion
of respondents selecting “other” reason for not donating
was under 1% of the whole sample.
The overall sample size diminishes at each stage of
the analysis, which may lead to concerns over, for ex-
ample, geographical representativeness of the analysis
sample. Due to small sample size in some of the regions,controlling by region was not practical. Instead, regions
were grouped by per capita income. Test of independence
(or equality of proportions) indicated that the null hypo-
thesis that the proportions are the same in the whole sam-
ple and the analysis sample cannot be rejected (chi2(2) =
2.065; p = 0.356). Furthermore, the sample selection model
indicates that incomplete information on those who are
not blood donors because of medical reasons does not
introduce a significant bias. In addition, the exogeneity
test rejects the possibility of biased and inconsistent esti-
mators due to simultaneity between the altruist and egali-
tarian variables.
The data we have are based on an interview survey,
and we only have what the respondent has told the in-
terviewer. Egalitarianism is measured by responses to a
question based on a hypothetical choice between two
policy scenarios in health, and one may criticise its sub-
stance. However, it should be noted that we define egali-
tarianism as a meta-preference. This means that there is
no real-world opportunity where true, or revealed, pref-
erences can be revealed through observable behaviours.
Altruism on the other hand is measured by response to
a question on respondent behaviour, regarding blood do-
nation. This may be more valid than the question on
egalitarianism, but there may be issues of interpretation
and/or recall. For example, we have not given the exact
definition of ‘regular’. If respondents were biased by so-
cial norms and were trying to appear pleasant to the
interviewer, then this would affect the two key variables
in the same way: social norms will inflate both egalitar-
ian preferences and altruistic blood donation. Further-
more, the fact that the egalitarian question preceded the
blood donation question in the interview may have influ-
enced the responses to the latter.
Compared to experimental settings, which have been
predominant in the monetary payoffs contexts, where
relevant scenarios can be manipulated to explore the
relevant parameters, interviews are very crude. However,
the objective of this paper is to probe about their real
world behaviour and to ask for their reasons for it,
which is better suited to interview surveys.
Overall, egalitarianism and altruism in health measured
in these ways are associated with each other. Those who
are or have been regular blood donors are more likely to
choose the egalitarian policy than would be expected from
their observed background characteristics.
Endnote
aHousehold income was also available but given the
high rate of missing cases of this variable (40%) and the
resulting final sample size, it is not used in the analysis.
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